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Abstract This paper examines the relationship between multimarket contact
(MMC) and the intensity of competition. We take advantage of a recent merger, which
altered the extent of MMC throughout the US airline industry, to understand the nature
of MMC’s impact on the airlines’ frequency of service. Evidence that non-price effects
of MMC are a part of the longer-term industry equilibrium is not robust. However,
we observe that following the merger the market players started taking the degree
of MMC into account in making their frequency decisions in line with the ‘mutual
forbearance’ hypothesis; however, the effect showed signs of diminishing over time.
Our results have implications for merger evaluation in industries where consolidation
may lead to a higher extent of multimarket contact.
Keywords Airline industry · Mergers · Multimarket contact · Product quality
JEL Classification D43 · L13 · L40 · L93
1 Introduction
Understanding the factors that affect the intensity of competition between firms is a
fundamental issue in industrial organization. It is customary for researchers to identify
low prices as the indicator of intense competition in the industry, and high prices as
either a manifestation of market power, or evidence of tacit collusion. At the same
time, both price and non-price product characteristics (especially product quality) are
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used by the firms as weapons in the fight for market share with the ultimate goal of
securing market power.
Multimarket contact (MMC) occupies a conspicuous place in the list of factors
that allegedly facilitate tacit collusion (and, more generally, ‘softer’ competition) in
imperfectly competitive markets. The idea of mutual forbearance, whereby a firm will
be inclined not to compete aggressively in a given market for fear of retaliation in
other markets where it competes with the same firms, has been around for decades,
yet it remained outside of the realm of rigorous theories of imperfectly competitive
markets until Bernheim and Whinston (1990) study.
Empirical research on the role of multimarket contact in softening competition has
mostly focused on the MMC-price relationship. Also, the higher degree of multimar-
ket contact that follows increasing-concentration events in an industry was previously
suggested to foster collusive behavior (Focarelli and Panetta 2003; Kim and Singal
1993; Singal 1996).
Our study is the first one to evaluate whether mergers that lead to increased MMC
can soften competition in non-price product characteristics. This question is of non-
trivial importance, as extensive multimarket contact is present in a number of important
and highly visible industries (e.g., banking, restaurants, hotels, and retail).
We take advantage of a merger between America West Airlines and US Airways—
an event that increased the extent of multimarket contact in the US airline industry—to
examine the potential effect of mutual forbearance on the airlines’ choice of frequency
of service. Frequency of service is a non-price product characteristic, which directly
affects the passengers’ full cost of travel.1 With higher frequency of service, an average
customer is more likely to find a flight that is closer to his preferred departure time,
diminishing the expected disutility of schedule delay, and lowering the total price of
the trip (airfare plus value of travel time). We thus hypothesize that softer competition
will arise via the airlines’ choice of lower frequency of service in markets with a higher
degree of MMC. Considering previous studies that suggest that consolidation events
can alter firms’ incentives to collude, we hypothesize that the merger could have pro-
vided the market participants with an incentive to soften competition, which would
alter the way MMC is taken into account by the market participants when choosing
frequency of service.
We use the data on non-stop flight frequencies throughout the US airline industry
for the two years before and after the merger. We employ the difference-in-differences
identification strategy to account for the general trends in the industry over this time
period; carrier- and market-specific heterogeneities are accounted for with the airline-
market fixed effects model. We use three measures of multimarket contact, including
two new ones in addition to using a measure found in the previous literature.
Data analysis suggests that the association between MMC and flight frequency
changed following the merger. This effect is most pronounced with the airline-
market specific (rather than the more conventional market-specific) measures of MMC.
Our data tell the following story: After the event, which increased industry-wide
concentration and the extent of multimarket contact, the airlines across the industry
1 Relevant theoretical models can be found, among others, in Brueckner (2004), and Flores-Fillol (2010).
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attempted to soften competition in a way that is consistent with the mutual forbear-
ance hypothesis. In the long run, however, it appears that this new arrangement had
only limited success. More generally, we can learn the following from our analysis:
First, multimarket contact can influence firms’ choices of non-price product charac-
teristics. Second, rather than being a part of the equilibrium industry structure, this
impact may be precipitated by an exogenous change in the level of MMC. Finally,
we suggest that mergers that have a significant industry-wide effect on the extent of
MMC may produce industry-wide strategic shifts in the choice of non-price product
characteristics.
2 Related Literature
Empirical studies of multimarket contact have focused on its effect on prices in
various industries. Pilloff (1999) and Focarelli and Panetta (2003) examine the
issue in the context of the banking industry. Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) study
the multimarket contact of cement producers. Busse (2000) evaluates the effect
of MMC on the telecommunications markets. Fernandez and Marin (1998) look
at the hotel industry. An earlier study by Feinberg (1985) provides an analysis
of the mutual forbearance hypothesis throughout various industries (focusing on
the effects of multimarket exposure on price-cost margins rather than on prices),
and finds more support for the hypothesis in the firm than in the industry-level
data.
Price effects of the multimarket contact in the airline industry have been stud-
ied by Evans and Kessides (1994) and Singal (1996). The only available anal-
ysis of the impact of MMC on non-price product characteristics (Prince and
Simon 2009) also looks at the airline industry, examining the impact on flight
delays and cancellations, and discovering the presumed effect. Prince and Simon
analyze the impact of MMC on frequency, and they fail to find any signifi-
cant relationship; however, their analysis examined the issue of multimarket con-
tact over a cross-section of markets. Our paper makes use of the panel data
structure; this allows us to incorporate the effect of an exogenous consolidation
event.
The following empirical studies of the airline industry are also related to this paper.
Pai (2010) offers a general examination of determinants of aircraft size and frequency
choices in the US airline industry. Bilotkach et al. (2010), focusing primarily on the
relationship between the frequency choice and distance, offer an analysis of the fre-
quency choice by the airlines on a set of European markets. Richard (2003) examines
the welfare effects of a hypothetical merger between American Airlines and United
Airlines for Chicago-originating routes, focusing on the carriers’ choice of prices and
frequency. Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) examine the price and market
power effects of the 1980s wave of airline mergers. Clougherty (2002) suggests that
US airline mergers improve the international competitiveness of US carriers. Mazzeo
(2003) establishes the relationship between airline competition and service quality
(measured by the airlines’ on-time performance). As a side note, our study is among
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the first ones to examine the effects of the recent large mergers in the US airline
industry.2
3 US Airways—America West Merger
USAir (later changed to US Airways) is the name that Allegheny Airlines adopted
after expanding throughout the 1980s, acquiring Pacific Southwest Airlines and Pied-
mont Airlines in 1987. The carrier has grown throughout the 1990s, developing hubs
in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charlotte, and Pittsburgh, as well as establishing itself as
the biggest airline at Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C.
US Airways was hit very hard by the events of September 11, 2001, holding on until
August 11, 2002, before entering the Chap. 11 bankruptcy protection.3 The carrier was
able to emerge from Chap. 11 in 2003, only to be forced there again on September 12,
2004, by rising fuel prices and deadlocked negotiations with unionized labor. At that
time, the airline’s share of domestic passengers was about 7%, down from over 10%
before September 11, 2001.
America West Airlines was one of the carriers that emerged after the deregulation
of the 1970s and early 1980s. The airline started flying on August 1, 1983, out of hubs
in Phoenix and Las Vegas. America West concentrated its operations in the Western
(more specifically, Southwestern) part of the US (in the 1990s the airline established a
smaller hub in Columbus, Ohio, which it dismantled in 2003); it also operated coast-
to-coast services, as well as flights to Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii. While an important
player in the Southwestern part of the US airline market, America West remained a
relatively small airline; its market share never exceeded 4% in terms of the number of
passengers carried (this was America West Airlines’ share just before the merger with
US Airways).
The two carriers, while operating non-overlapping networks, were no strangers to
each other: They were part of a code-sharing agreement, which also included United
Airlines. Soon after US Airways went into Chap. 11 proceedings for the second time
in 2004, America West suggested buying the carrier, and keeping US Airways name.
The merger did not meet much resistance from the regulators: The two airlines directly
competed on only half a dozen routes with non-stop flights, and their combined mar-
ket share in the US domestic market was only around 11%. The merger closed on
September 27, 2005, but negotiations with the labor unions and merging the airlines’
reservation systems was put off until a later date.4
The America West operating certificate was merged into that of US Airways (mean-
ing America West Airlines “officially” ceased to exist) only two years after the merger
2 In addition to the merger reviewed in this paper, Delta Air Lines acquired Northwest Airlines in October
of 2008. On October 1, 2010, United Airlines completed its merger with Continental Airlines, creating the
world’s largest air carrier.
3 According to the US Bankruptcy Code, a business can file for bankruptcy protection under either Chap. 7
(implying cessation of operations) or Chap. 11 (implying reorganization ultimately to stay in business).
4 As an example, US Airways’ pilots and flight attendants had on average been with the airline for a longer
time than had America West’s workers (since US Airways is an older airline). So, merging the carriers’
seniority lists proved to be a complicated matter.
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was closed; nevertheless, the carriers’ decision-making (as far as price setting and
scheduling is concerned) has been joint since the merger closing date. From Septem-
ber 27, 2005, until the merger of the operating certificates, all America West flights
have been announced as “US Airways flights operated by America West Airlines”.
The America West–US Airways merger provides a “clean” event for examining the
effects of multimarket contact for the following reasons: First, unlike the merger wave
in the 1980s, this was a stand-alone event. Second, the merger had repercussions for
the entire airline industry, as networks of the merger participants were complementary
and covered most of the US market. Third, unlike with the American Airlines’ acqui-
sition of TWA in April 2001, no catastrophic events occurred in the US airline industry
around the time of the merger that is examined in this paper. We thus should be able
to employ a relatively straightforward difference-in-differences estimation strategy to
account for the time trends and carrier-specific effect and identify the effect of the
merger on the MMC-frequency relationship in the US airline industry.
4 Data
4.1 Sample
The main dataset that we will use in our analysis is the T-100 Segment, collected
monthly by the US Department of Transportation. The dataset is downloadable from
the department’s web-site and contains, at the airline-airport-pair-market level, infor-
mation on the number of seats offered, passengers carried, and flights performed by
each airline in each market where the carrier offers non-stop passenger service. We
treat markets as non-directional5 (e.g., Los Angeles–Denver flights are lumped with
Denver–Los Angeles).
We confined our analysis to two years before the US Airways–America West merger
(2003 and 2004) and two years after the event (2006 and 2007). Further, we only used
information for February and July of each of the above years. Traditionally, February
is the month when demand for the air travel is at its trough, while in July it is at its
peak. Also, the airlines tend to revise their schedules semi-annually (so-called Winter
and Summer schedules); so, choosing only two months of the year, we will not lose
much information as far as the airlines’ choice of frequency is concerned.
We included only the routes within the contiguous United States (thereby excluding
flights to/from/within Alaska and Hawaii, as well as the flights to/from Puerto Rico).
We required that each airport on the route be located within a Metropolitan Statistical
Area,6 and that a route be served with scheduled commercial passenger airline flights
at least 20 times a month in February and 21 times in July.7 Regional carriers that pro-
vide services for the network airlines were merged with the corresponding network
5 Frequency (unlike, for instance, price) is usually not chosen directionally. Bilotkach et al. (2010) also
drop directionality in their study.
6 This will allow us easily to merge the traffic data with the MSA-level demographics.
7 Since the markets are not directional, this is roundtrip frequency, so we effectively included all the routes
between the airports that are located within the US Census Bureau’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas, on
which about one flight per three days was scheduled.
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carriers.8 For the eight month-year combinations that we included into our dataset,
we ended up with over 16,000 unique airline-airport-pair-market level observations,
representing a total of 1,926 unique airport-pair markets. Of those, 623 airport-pair
markets (corresponding to 6,854 observations) featured non-stop services by more
than one carrier in at least one of the months covered by our data.
The last restriction that we imposed on our sample involved excluding all markets
in which both US Airways and America West directly competed with non-stop ser-
vices prior to the merger. There were only six such markets, resulting in loss of merely
seventy observations.
4.2 Variables
As the dependent variable, we use the natural logarithm of monthly frequency at the
airline-route level.
The literature offers various measures of MMC, and there is no commonly accepted
way of constructing this variable. Route-specific measures are more popular in the air-
line industry studies. In this study we will, among others, use the average multimarket
contact measure that is identical to the one that was used by Evans and Kessides
(1994); however, our focus will be on the airline-market specific measures that we
construct ourselves.
Specifically, we will use two airline-market level measures of multimarket contact:
one that captures the ‘absolute’ extent of multimarket contact (denoted AMMC), and
the other one that measures MMC ‘relative’ to the airline’s total operations (we will
use notation RMMC for this one).
The first measure will count the number of markets in which the airline competes
with non-stop services with the other carrier(s) that it encounters on a given route.
Specifically, for each pair of airlines (i and j), we count the number of airport-pair
markets in which the two carriers both provide non-stop service (denote this number
as ni j ). Then, the extent of MMC for the airline i in market k will be calculated as:
AMMCki =
∑
j 6=i
I ki j ni j , (1)
where I ki j is simply the indicator of whether the two airlines both offer non-stop ser-
vice in the given airport-pair market; the summation is done over the population of
the airlines.
To calculate the second measure of airline-market level MMC, we will compute the
total number of flights that carrier i performs in markets in which it faces competition
8 In the US market, some of the commercial passenger services (particularly on thinner markets) are
performed by the so-called regional carriers, operating as agents of the major airlines. Those can be either
independent companies (SkyWest, Atlantic Southeast), or fully-owned subsidiaries of network carriers
(American Eagle). Several such airlines perform services for more than one major airline (e.g., SkyWest
flies as a Delta, United, and Midwest agent). Where a regional carrier was known to perform the flights for
more than one major airline, classification was made according to the hub airport to/from which the service
was performed; airlines that share hub airports have not been found to share a regional carrier.
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with the airline j with non-stop service (we will denote this number as fi j ). Specifi-
cally:
fi j =
∑
k
I ki j f ki . (2)
Summation in (2) is done over all the airport-pair markets. Then, if the total number
of flights that an airline i performs over its entire network is Fi , the “relative” measure
of MMC for the airline i in market k will be:
RMMCki =
1
Fi
∑
j 6=i
I ki j fi j . (3)
Both measures will be equal to zero for the monopoly airport-pair markets. Note also
that RMMC is not theoretically bounded by one from above, as flights overlapping
with several airlines are counted more than once in the numerator.
The market-specific measure of multimarket conduct we will use (this measure was
also used by Evans and Kessides 1994) is the average of the above-described measures
of “absolute” multimarket contact for a given market, or:
AvgMMCk =
(
N k
)−1
∗
∑
i
I ki ∗ AMMC
k
i , (4)
where N k is the number of unique carriers operating on the market k, and I ki is the
indicator of the airline i’s presence on the market. Note that mean of AvgMMC will
be the same as the mean of AMMC.
Table 1a includes descriptive statistics for frequency and MMC measures. It is evi-
dent that the US Airways–America West merger resulted in an appreciable increase in
the average MMC. This is especially remarkable in light of the fact that the combined
market share of the two airlines was only around 11%. This seemingly dispropor-
tionate increase in the extent of multimarket contact is explained by the fact that the
carriers’ networks did not overlap. For instance, a carrier (e.g., Continental Airlines)
that competed with US Airways in 20 markets and with America West in 30 other mar-
kets before the merger will after the merger find itself competing with the “new” US
Airways in 50 markets. Then, for the markets that had been Continental-US Airways
or Continental-America West duopolies before the merger (and remained Continen-
tal-US Airways duopolies after the merger), our AMMC would increase from 20 to
50 (note that on the duopoly routes AMMC takes on the same value for both airlines).
However, if ten of those markets overlapped, Continental Airlines would find itself
competing in 40 markets with the “new” US Airways. In the markets that had before
the merger been triopolies with Continental Airlines, US Airways, and America West
present, the value of AMMC for Continental Airlines would decrease from 50 to 40
(other things equal).
Also visible from Table 1a is the general trend toward lower frequency of ser-
vice over time. This is actually just a reflection of a longer term tendency for using
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smaller aircraft in the US domestic markets, unrelated to the US Airways–Amer-
ica West merger. Note however that the frequency trend is more pronounced on the
non-monopoly routes.
Our estimation technique of choice will be the airline-airport-pair-market fixed
effects. This model is appropriate in light of the fact that most participants9 in the US
domestic market operate hub-and-spoke networks (e.g., Delta Air Lines channels a lot
of its traffic via its hub at Atlanta Hartsfield Airport). Thus, decisions on frequency
on the hub-spoke routes (such as Delta Air Lines’ New Orleans to Atlanta flight) will
be driven not only by the demand in this particular market, but also (and sometimes
predominantly) by the demand in a multitude of the spoke-to-spoke markets to which
the airline’s passengers will be connecting via the hub (many of the passengers on New
Orleans-Atlanta flight will be traveling elsewhere via Atlanta, and Delta has to take this
into account when deciding how many flights to schedule between these two cities).
The airline-airport-pair-market fixed effects specification captures the heterogeneities
associated with the structure of the airlines’ networks.
To account for the market-specific heterogeneities that are not captured by the fixed
effects, we will use the following control variables: Market size will be captured by
the geometric averages of the endpoints’ per capita income and population (at the
respective MSA level).10 Route-level passenger Herfindhal-Hirschmann index (at the
airport-pair market level) will be used to account for market concentration. Time
(month–year, month, and year) dummy variables will control for the corresponding
heterogeneities.11 Since the airlines’ frequency decisions may depend on the price that
carriers can command, we include a measure of airfares. We have used the airport-
level average airfares for originating passengers, reported by the US Department of
Transportation (DOT). DOT collects a quarterly 10% sample of actual airline itiner-
aries, known as databank DB1B. This sample includes various itineraries—one-way
and roundtrip, non-stop and connecting flights. Then, DOT uses DB1B dataset for
the US domestic market to compute average fares for trips that originate at various
airports. This is what we will refer to as the airport-level average airfares. We have
taken the average of this fare for the two airports (note that our frequency data is
non-directional), and lagged it one year to avoid the otherwise inevitable endogeneity
problem.
The Herfindhal-Hirschmann index (HHI) is potentially endogenous. To correct for
this problem, we have used the number of competitors at the airport-pair-market level
as an instrument. This instrument (note that it is negatively correlated with HHI) is
moderately strong—with the correlation coefficient around−0.6. One can legitimately
argue that this instrument might not completely resolve the problem of correlation with
9 Southwest Airlines relies more on direct point-to-point services, while still technically operating several
smaller hubs.
10 We need to acknowledge here that within-variation in these variables, especially in population, is not
substantial over the time period that we considered, leading to potential inefficiency of the estimates. How-
ever, excluding these variables from the specifications would likely lead to model misspecifications, with
far more serious results than mere inefficiency.
11 Due to the obvious multicollinearity issue, we have only been able to include a limited number of such
dummy variables. Specifically, we used dummy variables for month of July, years 2004 and 2006, and the
February-2007 and July-2004 interactions.
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the error term; this is true to the extent that unobserved shocks that lead to entry or
exit also change the competing airlines’ frequency of service. At the very least, the
likelihood of the unobserved shocks that affect a given airline’s frequency of service
also affecting HHI is much higher than that of the same shocks causing market entry
or exit. Similar results to those reported here (with a loss of the number of observa-
tions and goodness of fit) were obtained using the lagged number of competitors as
the instrument for HHI. Note also that our study is the first one to take account of the
potential endogeneity of HHI in airline frequency regressions.
Table 1b presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables we use. Since
our data analysis will focus in large part on the sub-sample of routes with non-stop
competition, descriptive statistics for this set of markets are reported separately.
5 Analysis and Results
5.1 Hypotheses and Methodology
Our aim is to examine how multimarket contact is taken into account by the market
players in determining the frequency of service. The anti-competitive effects of mul-
timarket contact on the non-price product characteristics can be manifested through
the lower frequency of service with the higher extent of MMC, other things equal. As
discussed above, lower frequency increases the total cost of travel for passengers by
increasing schedule delay.
We will perform the analysis in two ways. First, we will not separate the potential
impact of the merger, effectively evaluating whether MMC affects frequency in the
longer-term industry equilibrium. Second, we will postulate that the US Airways–
America West merger, having increased the extent of MMC, could have had a structural
effect on the way that MMC affects the airlines’ choice of frequency.
Making such a distinction will allow us to make conclusions as to the origins of
the effect of multimarket contact. If we determine that the merger was the primary
force behind any observed association between the MMC and softer competition, we
will conclude that changes in the industry structure can have a ‘structural’ impact
on the market players’ strategies. Any estimated effect of MMC in the analysis that
assumes that the merger had no impact will give us a general indication of the effect
that multimarket contact has on the airlines’ non-price competition strategies in what
could be considered a longer-term industry equilibrium.
To sum up, the postulated association between the MMC and the airlines’ frequency
of service is that we expect a greater extent of MMC to be associated with a lower
frequency of service.
If this association is a part of the longer-term industry equilibrium, we will observe
it through the corresponding sign of the coefficients on measures of MMC. A study
of the effect of the merger on MMC-frequency relationship following the merger will
require a difference-in-differences identification strategy. We will need to account for
general market and time effects, and try to ensure that the post-merger effect of MMC
on frequency is over and above any ‘usual’ effect of multimarket contact.
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We will approach the problem in two ways: First, since the increase in MMC fol-
lowing the merger should not have changed the airlines’ choices on the monopoly
markets beyond the general industry trend, any post-merger versus pre-merger dif-
ference in frequency choices on the non-monopoly markets that also experienced a
change in the level of MMC (i.e., markets served by either of the merger participants)
should be more significant than the same comparison for the monopoly routes. The
corresponding specification will be:
Log(Frequency) = β1 Inon−monopoly + β2 Ipost−merger + β3 IUSHPMarkets
+β4 Ipost−merger ∗ IUSHPMarkets
+β5 Inon−monopoly ∗ IUSHPMarkets
+β6 Inon−monopoly ∗ Ipost−merger
+β7 Ipost−merger ∗ Inon−monopoly ∗ IUSHPMarkets
+controls+ error. (5)
Here, IUSHPMarkets stands for the indicator variable for the markets that were served by
either US Airways or America West Airlines;12 the remaining notations are self-
explanatory. Then, the key variable will be the post-merger-non-monopoly-route-
USHP interaction. If our hypothesis of the structural impact of the merger on the
MMC-frequency relationship is true, the corresponding coefficient (β7) will be neg-
ative.
This approach, however, does not take advantage of our measures of MMC; also,
any changes in the airlines’ competition strategies that are not associated with the
change in MMC and result in lower frequency will yield observationally equivalent
results. Our second approach will utilize our measures of multimarket contact at the
expense of excluding monopoly airport-pair markets from the sample. Specifically,
we will estimate the following regression:
Log(Frequency) = γ1MMC+ γ2 Ipost−merger + γ3 IUSHPMarkets
+γ4 Ipost−merger ∗ IUSHPMarkets + γ5MMC ∗ IUSHPMarkets
+γ6 Ipost−merger ∗MMC ∗ IUSHPMarkets + controls+ error, (6)
where MMC is one of our measures of multimarket contact. The main variable is again
the interaction between the post-merger indicator, the measure of multimarket contact,
and the dummy for markets in which the merger participants operate. As before, if
our hypothesis is true, the corresponding coefficient (γ6 this time) will be negative.
Note that the specification that evaluates the effect of MMC unconditionally from the
merger will include only MMC and the dummy variables for the merger and for the
USHP markets, and exclude any of this variable’s interactions with other regressors.
As noted above, we have estimated both market level and airline-market level fixed
effects models; our focus however will be on the latter. We have used both GLS with
12 Recall that markets that were served by both US Airways and America West have been thrown out of
the sample.
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cluster robust standard errors,13 and the instrumental variable technique (two-stage
least squares, or 2SLS), using the number of competitors as the instrument for HHI.
To examine the longer-run structural effect of the merger on the MMC-frequency
relationship, we have rerun our specifications, restricting the sample in the following
ways: First, we have excluded the first year after the merger (year 2006); second,
we have only retained years 2003 and 2007 (2 years before and two years after the
merger).
A usual robustness check of the difference-in-differences estimator involves incor-
rectly imposing the timing of the shock. If the effect is still observed when the tim-
ing of the shock is incorrect, one may suspect that the data analysis methodology is
flawed. The main robustness check we will administer will involve artificially placing
the merger between 2003–2004 and 2006–2007. This will redefine (rather, incorrectly
define) the post-merger time period. Also, to check that our results are not driven by the
non-linearity of the MMC-frequency relationship, we included both MMC and MMC-
squared terms as independent variables in the regressions that evaluate the uncondi-
tional effect of MMC. The results are not reported here; however, MMC-squared was
not significant in any of the 2SLS airline-market level fixed effects models.
5.2 Results
The estimation results are presented in the following tables: Table 2 reports the results
of estimation (5); both market and airline-market fixed effects models are presented.
Table 3 includes results for the markets with non-stop competition; here we only report
the airline-market fixed effects specifications, making a distinction between GLS and
2SLS techniques in panels (a) and (b), respectively. Note that we also make a dis-
tinction between evaluating the effect of MMC on frequency unconditionally for the
merger (i.e., as a part of the longer-term industry equilibrium), and examining whether
the merger could have caused a structural shift in the market players’ strategies. Table 4
reports results for the sub-samples excluding year 2006, as well as including only years
2003 and 2007. The robustness check imposing the artificial—and incorrect—merger
dates is presented in Table 5.
The results of the market-level fixed effects model, reported in Table 2, indicate that
following the merger, frequency of service on the non-monopolized markets decreased
more significantly than on the monopolistic airport-pair routes. The size of this effect
is small (1.2%) and only marginally significant in market fixed effects model without
IV, and strengthens in both magnitude (to about 4.3%) and significance when HHI is
instrumented for with the number of competitors. However, this effect does not carry
over to a more realistic airline-market fixed effects model.
Evaluating the results for the markets with nonstop competition (Table 3), we see
substantial qualitative differences between the GSL and the 2SLS specifications. Most
strikingly, the evidence of the unconditional MMC-frequency relationship vanishes
when we instrument for HHI. At the same time, the evidence of the hypothesized effect
of the merger on the MMC-frequency relationship carries over to the instrumental var-
13 We control for both across cross-section heteroscedasticity and within cross-section autocorrelation.
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iable specifications. Note that this evidence is only robust for the airline-market level
measures of multimarket contact. Numerically, the coefficient on the AMMC× Post-
Merger × USHPMarket interaction variable from the corresponding specification in
Table 3b suggests about a 7.3% decrease in frequency of service at the mean value
of AMMC for the sub-sample of routes with the non-stop competition.14 Given the
corresponding sub-sample mean frequency, this translates into 16 fewer flights per
month. To put this into perspective, the average carrier in the affected markets cuts
roughly two roundtrips per week (as opposed to what that carrier would have done
absent the merger). The corresponding effect for RMMC is slightly larger—around a
9.5% reduction in frequency at the sub-sample mean. This translates into almost 21
fewer flights per month, or about 2.5 roundtrips per week.
The results presented in Table 4 show limited support for the supposition that the
effect of the merger on the MMC-frequency relationship was long-lived. This appears
consistent with the carriers’ attempting to soften competition following an event that
increased the extent of MMC throughout the industry; yet we can also say that this
attempt was not especially successful, as the lack of evidence for the longer-term “stra-
tegic” shift following the merger suggests. The robustness checks that are reported in
Table 5 demonstrate that (with only one exception) setting the merger date arbitrarily
does not produce the previously detected effect of the merger on the MMC-frequency
relationship.
Thus, we postulated that the US Airways–America West merger could have pro-
duced a change in MMC significant enough for the increase in multimarket contact
to start affecting the airlines’ frequency choices. We determined this to be true for the
airline-market fixed effects specifications and the airline-market specific measures of
MMC; evidence for the route-specific measure of multimarket contact is weaker. The
structural effect of merger on the impact of MMC that we detect is actually consis-
tent with the findings of previous studies of the price effects of multimarket contact
(Focarelli and Panetta 2003; Kim and Singal 1993; Singal 1996).
In summary, the post-merger effect of MMC on frequency—the key non-price
characteristic of airline services—has been to decrease it, thereby making travel less
convenient for an average passenger, and effectively increasing the total price of the
trip. Our results imply that the well-documented anti-competitive price effects of
MMC may be compounded by the lower product quality, at least following an event
that increases the extent of the multimarket contact. Moreover, since frequency of ser-
vice is directly related to the total cost of travel for the passengers, we are effectively
documenting the MMC-price effect, looking at it from a different angle.
The effect that we observed dissipates over time; this appears to be consistent
with a not exceptionally successful attempt at softening the competition on the non-
price side of the product characteristics following a consolidation event, which has
increased the extent of MMC throughout the industry. Finally, robustness checks that
14 To get this number, simply multiply the corresponding regression coefficient from Table 3b by the aver-
age AMMC for the sub-sample of markets with non-stop competition, from Table 1b. Then, recall that the
resulting number is the estimate of the difference in logarithm of frequency of service, which approximates
percentage change.
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we implemented suggested that the observed effect is due to the merger, and cannot
be considered random or explainable by general industry trends.
The control variables exhibit relatively stable behavior across specifications, with
one notable exception. The effect of the measure of market concentration that we
employ (the Herfindhal-Hirschmann index) reverses when we move from GLS to
instrumental variables specifications. On the one hand, we can expect that the air-
lines’ competition in frequency of service may lead to higher frequency of service in
response to less market concentration, other things equal (e.g., Bilotkach et al. 2010).
On the other hand, when some market participants increase their frequency of ser-
vice, HHI will increase even if the competitors do not respond to this change in any
way, implying a potential positive correlation between the two variables. Note that
our study is the first one to recognize this endogeneity between frequency and market
concentration. Other control variables exhibit expected behavior: frequency rises with
per capita income, population, and airfares.
6 Concluding Comments
This paper takes advantage of a recent merger in the US airline industry to examine
the effects of the multimarket contact on the market players’ behavior from a new
angle. Specifically, we examine the effects of MMC on frequency as the most notable
non-price product characteristic of the airlines’ services. Our study differs from most
of the previous literature on the issue of multimarket contact, which looks at the price
effects. We would like to learn whether the well-documented price effects are exacer-
bated on the product quality side, so that “mutual forbearance” leads not only to higher
prices, but also to lower product quality. At the same time, our investigation is related
to the studies of price effects of multimarket contact, since the measure of quality that
we have chosen (frequency of service) directly affects the passengers’ total price of
travel, which includes the airfare and the value of travel time.
We examine the impact of MMC both unconditionally on the merger, and postu-
lating that the merger, having changed the degree of the multimarket contact through-
out the industry, could have served as a structural shock for the market participants,
affecting the impact of multimarket contact on the airlines’ choice of frequency. This
suggestion is consistent with the literature that finds that mergers could have changed
the nature of competition among market participants.
We did find that the US Airways–America West merger changed the way that the
airlines take into account the extent of MMC when making strategic choices as to
frequency of service. Specifically, following the merger, the greater extent of MMC
became associated with a lower frequency (above and beyond the general industry
trend for fewer flights). The documented effects show up more robustly in the specifi-
cations employing the airline-market specific measures of MMC, as compared to the
regressions using a market-specific measure (the latter approach appears to be more
popular in the literature).
Also, we found that the obtained effects are larger in magnitude immediately after
the merger than when evaluated over a more extended time period. This pattern appears
consistent with the attempt to use a greater extent of multimarket contact following
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the merger to reach an equilibrium involving softer competition, manifested in lower
product quality (in particular, lower frequency). This serves as additional evidence
of the “structural” shock that the merger had: It appears that in the longer term, the
effect of MMC is weak (as also evidenced by the not robust unconditional effect on
frequency), but an exogenous change in the extent of multimarket contact will affect
the market participants’ conduct.
We can learn the following from our analysis: First, multimarket contact can influ-
ence the firm’s choices of non-price product characteristics. Second, rather than being a
part of equilibrium industry structure, this impact may be precipitated by an exogenous
change in the level of MMC. Finally, we suggest that mergers that have a significant
industry-wide effect on the extent of MMC may produce industry-wide strategic (and
not pro-competitive) shifts in the choice of non-price product characteristics. The list
of industries in which a merger can have a large-scale effect on the extent of multi-
market contact is potentially long (hotels, fast food restaurants, banking, retail, just
to name a few–generally, any industry where competition is between the chains of
stores); therefore, it will be possible and interesting to apply our methodology to
other industries to gauge the general applicability of our results. If similar evidence
to that presented here is collected for other markets, this may point to an additional
effect that should be taken into consideration when evaluating proposed mergers and
acquisitions.
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